(story to be published in tomorrow’s issue, March 15)
What happened in Romanian politically and economically after the Europeans Union’s historic decision to invite it to start accession talks – the first truly concrete signal, although not with immediate implications, received from the West in the ten post-Revolution years – expresses with extreme relevance the vicious circle the country is kept in by its political class, despite the historic decision in question, which, in principle, could give Romania for the first time the opportunity of a real and practical connection to the Western world, pulling it out of its Eastern condemnation or from the “grey area,” which is about the same thing. Although they won’t take the trouble to praise this opportunity, in fact assuming merits in acquiring it, whether with a stand on the Kosovo situation, with a general pro-Western attitude, by always insisting that the entire domestic and foreign policy be placed under the commandments of accession into the European Union and NATO, and demanding the same of the opposition, the political forces in government compromise even those small steps that should be taken as a signal that things are changing in Romania, that the Helsinki decision was not made for nothing. The ground lost non-linearly between political forces in the coalition compared to 1996, when cohabitation and functioning mechanisms and rules were set, has unleashed a fierce battle between them to split the pie according to the new ratio of forces. The coagulation capacity therefore continues to drop, weakening the consistency of steps taken before and driving away the chances of organising those actions and programmes that are needed to promote reform and prepare for accession. The indispensable recovery in public administration has at last begun at the Government, but it also stopped there. The algorithm did not allow the operation to climb down the bureaucratic-hierarchical stairs to ministries, government agencies, governor’s offices, city halls, etc. With the algorithm’s servitude, institutional reform will remain blocked, and without institutional reform, there can be no economic reform, no prospect of joining the European Union. Tensions between government partners inevitably rise as elections are nearing. None of them, truthfully, has anything to show to the electorate – since they are accomplices to the economic and social failure of government – but everyone seems to believe that if he separates himself from the others, suggesting at least that the guilt should belong to the former, his chances might be better. In any event, it must be noted that, aside from President Constantinescu, who from time to time – and totally unskilfully – sends out an electoral-flavoured accusation to the opposition, the political forces in power seem more preoccupied in pulling the carpet from under each other’s feet, than in preparing for an electoral clash with the opposition. On the last straight run, everyone still wants something from someone else, and, embarrassingly, nepotistic initiatives (arranged financing and tenders) are launched one after another to get one more piece from a dirt-poor budget. In fact, political forces in power are seemingly undermining their own capacity of doing something consistent, if, of course, they have that ability in the first place! In any case, the overall message the political class in power is sending to those abroad who have learned about the Helsinki decision can only be that Romania is unable to deal with its own problems. It is the same message that came out of Romania before the Helsinki decision. Had that decision been final, to take Romania under the cloak, none of this would have mattered. Because in such a case, the European Union would ultimately have to put in some effort, removing obstacles from Romania, perhaps even reconfiguring its political class, and combining this political action with one that had financial significance, making things up. But what if the Helsinki decision is only a test, and, more concretely, a compromise between those who have accepted to consider Romania and those who cannot stand the idea or are conditioning it? And this is how it sounds: we let Romania take a test, if it does – great, if not – see you! Let’s not get drunk with cold water and think that after the Helsinki decision, Romania’s fate has been already decided, and that it will be ultimately absorbed for good, even unwillingly, by the Western world. The United States, which has no connection to the Helsinki decision, has not defined its policy and has not stated its interests in the Balkans. After its forceful intervention in Yugoslavia, passing the problems to the West-Europeans means that the decision on American policy and interests in the area is left to the next administration. Until then, Washington will have found out how the wind is blowing in Russia. After all, Russia has not said its last word in the area. And Mr. Putin, the potential winner of the Kremlin seat, seems more determined than his predecessors to play hard on Russia’s foreign card, despite the dramatic problems of the domestic economy. It is not at all clear whether America, the great America, will play its own card in the area or, lacking major interests, will only play the European Union’s card or, on the contrary, Russia’s card? With this in mind, EU’s decision on Romania and Bulgaria could be a strategic one that exploits Russian weaknesses and American indecision, but it could just as well be a momentary decision intended to buy time. There are no clear reasons to the 180-degree turn in British attitude toward Romania: from an open refusal of having to do with Romania, to active French-like courtesy, manifested before by the governments in Paris and Rome. But another big question mark is the change of mood in Berlin, which agreed to inviting Romania to start joining talks, although before Helsinki, the German vote, decisive in the European Union, has always been against Bucharest. Nevertheless, Germany insists on inter-Balkan cooperation, a sign that it is less concerned about Romania and Bulgaria being absorbed into the European Union, than with the establishment, including in the Balkans and with these two countries’ participation, of an economic alternative to the pressure everyone in the area is exerting toward being accepted into the European Union. Perhaps year 2000 will bring the necessary qualifications, showing whether Romania’s fate has been already played! Anyway, if the European Union’s stand taken in Helsinki was a strategic but not irreversible one – much more if it was only a test – the goodwill of those who made the decision will remain platonic if Romania fails to honour it as it should. Platonic means without some money changing hands! Without money, Romania cannot get out of this smudge, and will keep falling, even in the improbable case that the political class eventually awakens. Before Helsinki, Romania was in a hopeless vicious circle. The Helsinki decision, although with very, very remote effects, seemed to have broken this vicious circle, opening at least a window for hope. What is happening today in Romania through the contribution of its political class to government is not helping those in Western Europe who have supported Romania’s cause, even discourages them and makes them feel fed up. To say nothing of the others, who have chosen to keep their distance from Romania, due to their doubts and who now can only become categorical and say without hesitation: see, we told you so, better not deal with Romania. Romania’s fate has not been played yet! Instead of resting on the counter-productive and even dangerous idea that Romania’s fate has been played already, Romanian politicians had better not toy with it!